Is there a somewhat-reliable way to detect that a list of integers came from a common PRNG?

Question 1

Unless you are prepared to break new ground in number theory, you would only be able to detect obsolete, badly designed, or poorly seeded PRNGs. Good PRNGs are explicitly designed to prevent what you are trying to do. Random number generation is a critical part of digital cryptography, so a lot of effort goes into producing random numbers that meet all known tests.

There are batteries of tests to profile PRNGs. See for example this NIST page.

As the comments point out, the first two sentences are overstated and are only strictly true for PRNGs that may be used in cryptography. Weaker (i.e. more predictable) PRNGs might be chosen for other domains in order to improve time or space performance.

Question 2

You can write a battery of tests for a list of candidate generators, but there are a lot of generators, and some have enormous state where adjacent values of a well-seeded generator will reveal nothing useful and you'll have to see wait for a long time before you can get the two data points which will have an informative relationship.

On the plus side; while the list of random number generators that you might encounter is vast, there are telltale signs that will help you identify some classes of simple generators quickly and then you can perform focussed analysis to derive the specific configuration.

Unfortunately even a simple generator like KISS shows that while the generator can be trivially broken when you know its configuration, it can hide its signature from anything that does not know its configuration, leaving you in a situation where you have to individually test for every possible configuration.

There are quality tests like dieharder and TestU01 which will consume many megabytes of data to identify any weakness in a generator; however, these can also identify weaknesses in real RNGs, so they could give a strong false positive.

To consume only a 100 integers you would really need to have a list of generators in mind. For example, to detect LCG used inappropriately, you simply test to see if the bottom three bits cycle through a repeating pattern of 8 values -- but this is by far the easiest case.

Question 3

If you had a sequence 625 or more 32-bit integers, you could detect with high confidence whether it was from consecutive calls to Mersenne Twister. That is because it leaks state information in the output values.

For an example of how it is done, see this blog entry.

Similar results are in theory possible when you don't have ideal data such as full 32-bit integers, but you would need a longer sequence and the maths gets harder. You would also need to know - or perhaps guess by trying obvious options - how the numbers were being reduced from the larger range to the smaller one.

Similar results are possible from other PRNGs, but generally only the non-cryptographic ones.

In principle you could identify specific PRNG sequences with very high confidence, but even simple barriers such as missing numbers from the strict sequence can make it a lot harder. There will also be many PRNGs that you will not be able to reliably detect, and typically you will either have close to 100% confidence of a match (to a hackable PRNG) or 0% confidence of any match.

Whether or not a PRNG is a hackable (and therefore could be detected by the numbers it emits) is not a general indicator of PRNG quality. Obviously, "hackable" is opposite to a requirement for "secure", so don't consider Mersenne Twister for creating unguessable codes. However, do consider it as a source of randomness for e.g. neural networks, genetic algorithms, monte-carlo simulations and other places where you need a lot of statistically random-looking data.