Do formal methods of program verfication have a place in industry?

Question

I took a glimpse on Hoare Logic in college. What we did was really simple. Most of what I did was proving the correctness of simple programs consisting of while loops, if statements, and sequence of instructions, but nothing more. These methods seem very useful!

Are formal methods used in industry widely?

Are these methods used to prove mission-critical software?

Answer 1

This is a question close to my heart (I'm a researcher in Software Verification using formal logics), so you'll probably not be surprised when I say I think these techniques have a useful place, and are not yet used enough in the industry.

There are many levels of "formal methods", so I'll assume you mean those resting on a rigourous mathematical basis (as opposed to, say, following some 6-Sigma style process). Some types of formal methods have had great success - type systems being one example. Static analysis tools based on data flow analysis are also popular, model checking is almost ubiquitous in hardware design, and computational models like Pi-Calculus and CCS seem to be inspiring some real change in practical language design for concurrency. Termination analysis is one that's had a lot of press recently - The SDV project at Microsoft and work by Byron Cook are recent examples of research/practice crossover in formal methods.

Hoare Reasoning has not, so far, made great inroads in the industry - this is for more reasons than I can list, but I suspect is mostly around the complexity of writing then proving specifications for real programs (they tend to get big, and fail to express properties of many real world environments). Various sub-fields in this type of reasoning are now making big inroads into these problems - Separation Logic being one.

This is partially the nature of ongoing (hard) research. But I must confess that we, as theorists, have entirely failed to educate the industry on why our techniques are useful, to keep them relevant to industry needs, and to make them approachable to software developers. At some level, that's not our problem - we're researchers, often mathematicians, and practical usage is not foremost in our minds. Also, the techniques being developed are often too embryonic for use in large scale systems - we work on small programs, on simplified systems, get the math working, and move on. I don't much buy these excuses though - we should be more active in pushing our ideas, and getting a feedback loop between the industry and our work (one of the main reasons I went back to research).

It's probably a good idea for me to resurrect my weblog, and make some more posts on this stuff...

Answer 2

Well, Sir Tony Hoare joined Microsoft Research about 10 years ago, and one of the things he started was a formal verification of the Windows NT kernel. Indeed, this was one of the reasons for the long delay of Windows Vista: starting with Vista, large parts of the kernel are actually formally verified wrt. to certain properties like absence of deadlocks, absence of information leaks etc.

This is certainly not typical, but it is probably the single most important application of formal program verification, in terms of its impact (after all, almost every human being is in some way, shape or form affected by a computer running Windows).

Answer 3

I cannot comment much on mission-critical software, although I know that the avionics industry uses a wide variety of techniques to validate software, including Hoare-style methods.

Formal methods have suffered because early advocates like Edsger Dijkstra insisted that they ought to be used everywhere. Neither the formalisms nor the software support were up to the job. More sensible advocates believe that these methods should be used on problems that are hard. They are not widely used in industry, but adoption is increasing. Probably the greatest inroads have been in the use of formal methods to check safety properties of software. Some of my favorite examples are the SPIN model checker and George Necula's proof-carrying code.

Moving away from practice and into research, Microsoft's Singularity operating-system project is about using formal methods to provide safety guarantees that ordinarily require hardware support. This in turn leads to faster performance and stronger guarantees. For example, in singularity they have proved that if a third-party device driver is allowed into the system (which means basic verification conditions have been proved), then it cannot possibly bring down that whole OS–he worst it can do is hose its own device.

Formal methods are not yet widely used in industry, but they are more widely used than they were 20 years ago, and 20 years from now they will be more widely used still. So you are future-proofed :-)

Answer 4

Yes, they are used, but not widely in all areas. There are more methods than just hoare logic, some are used more, some less, depending on suitability for given task. The common problem is that sofware is biiiiiiig and verifying that all of it is correct is still too hard a problem.

For example the theorem-prover (a software that aids humans in proving program correctness) ACL2 has been used to prove that a certain floating-point processing unit does not have a certain type of bug. It was a big task, so this technique is not too common.

Model checking, another kind of formal verification, is used rather widely nowadays, for example Microsoft provides a type of model checker in the driver development kit and it can be used to verify the driver for a set of common bugs. Model checkers are also often used in verifying hardware circuits.

Rigorous testing can be also thought of as formal verification - there are some formal specifications of which paths of program should be tested and so on.

Answer 5

"Are formal methods used in industry?"

Yes.

The assert statement in many programming languages is related to formal methods for verifying a program.

"Are formal methods used in industry widely ?"

No.

"Are these methods used to prove mission-critical software ?"

Sometimes. More often, they're used to prove that the software is secure. More formally, they're used to prove certain security-related assertions about the software.

Answer 6

There are two different approaches to formal methods in the industry.

One approach is to change the development process completely. The Z notation and the B method that were mentioned are in this first category. B was applied to the development of the driverless subway line 14 in Paris (if you get a chance, climb in the front wagon. It's not often that you get a chance to see the rails in front of you).

Another, more incremental, approach is to preserve the existing development and verification processes and to replace only one of the verification tasks at a time by a new method. This is very attractive but it means developing static analysis tools for exiting, used languages that are often not easy to analyse (because they were not designed to be). If you go to (for instance)

http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/indices/a-tree/d/Delmas:David.html

(sorry, only one hyperlink allowed for new users :( )

you will find instances of practical applications of formal methods to the verification of C programs (with static analyzers Astrée, Caveat, Fluctuat, Frama-C) and binary code (with tools from AbsInt GmbH).

By the way, since you mentioned Hoare Logic, in the above list of tools, only Caveat is based on Hoare logic (and Frama-C has a Hoare logic plug-in). The others rely on abstract interpretation, a different technique with a more automatic approach.

Answer 7

My area of expertise is the use of formal methods for static code analysis to show that software is free of run-time errors. This is implemented using a formal methods technique known "abstract interpretation". The technique essentially enables you to prove certain atributes of a s/w program. E.g. prove that a+b will not overflow or x/(x-y) will not result in a divide by zero. An example static analysis tool that uses this technique is Polyspace.

With respect to your question: "Are formal methods used in industry widely?" and "Are these methods used to prove mission-critical software?"

The answer is yes. This opinion is based on my experience and supporting the Polyspace tool for industries that rely on the use of embedded software to control safety critical systems such as electronic throttle in an automobile, braking system for a train, jet engine controller, drug delivery infusion pump, etc. These industries do indeed use these types of formal methods tools.

I don't believe all 100% of these industry segments are using these tools, but the use is increasing. My opinion is that the Aerospace and Automotive industries lead with the Medical Device industry quickly ramping up use.

Answer 8

Polyspace is a a (hideously expensive, but very good) commercial product based on program verification. It's fairly pragmatic, in that it scales up from 'enhanced unit testing that will probably find some bugs' to 'the next three years of your life will be spent showing these 10 files have zero defects'.

It is based more on negative verification ('this program won't corrupt your stack') instead positive verification ('this program will do precisely what these 50 pages of equations say it will').

Answer 9

To add to Jorg's answer, here's an interview with Tony Hoare. The tools Jorg's referring to, I think, are PREfast and PREfix. See here for more information.

Answer 10

Besides of other more procedural approaches, Hoare logic was in the basis of Design by Contract, introduced as an object oriented technique by Bertrand Meyer in Eiffel (see Meyer's article of 1992, page 4). While Design by Contract is not the same as formal verification methods (for one thing, DbC doesn't prove anything until the software is executed), in my opinion it provides a more practical use.